AWAKENING THE SLEEPING GIANT: MAKING NIGERIA WORK AGAIN (I) - (V)
By Professor George Ayittey (This is a 5-part series on the Nigeria question: Prof. George B. N. Ayittey dissects the problems besetting Africa's most populated nation).
One insightful way of describing
The myriad of Nigeria’s complex and inter-twined problems can be daunting and debilitating in unraveling or solving. Some Nigerians yearn for another military coup for a military dictator to knock heads and solve their problems. This proposal, in my view, is out of the question. First, the record of military rule in Africa is abysmal. Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Chad, among others including Nigeria, were all ruined by military coconut-heads. They were all generals. Even General I.B. Babangida (rtd), himself remarked that: “Every military regime is a fraud. Anybody who heads a military regime subverts the wishes of the people”(The African Observer, Jan 18-31, 1999; p.6). Second, the entire West African region is fed up with military coups. ECOWAS will never support a coup in Nigeria. Witness ECOWAS response to the coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau.
Some Nigerians have suggested a break-up of the country. This is also a non-starter. Even the hopeless African Union would not support that because it would set a dangerous precedent for the continent. Africa has more than 2,000 ethnic groups and if each aggrieved group were to break away, we might end up with over 1,000 little “Djiboutis,” each with its own national flag, anthem and perhaps a Swiss bank account for its president. And Nigeria could also end with over 250 mini countries.
Still other Nigerians say a strongman is needed to end the nonsense and clean up the mess but this is a wrong approach. Remember what President Obama said in Accra in July 2009: “Africa doesn’t need strongmen; it needs strong institutions.”
Road Analogy – Traffic Laws
A useful way of analyzing Nigeria’s problems is to use a road analogy. In Nigeria, drivers are required to drive on the right and to stop at STOP signs or when the traffic light turns red. They must yield to pedestrians in crosswalks or zebra crossings and must obey the speed limit. If they are making a turn, they must switch on their turn signals. They must obey one-way signs and so on. The body of these rules and regulations is called TRAFFIC LAWS. If ALL drivers obey the traffic laws, there would be sanity on the roads and it would be possible to get from Point A to Point B SAFELY and in good time.
Now, imagine a situation where only a few drivers obey the rules of the road or traffic laws. Assume some big buffoon thinks he can drive anyway he likes at whatever speed – even the wrong way. Assume another nitwit insists on driving on the left side of the road because he is left-handed. Guess what would happen on the roads. There would be horrendous carnage, chaos, fatal accidents, and wreckage.
Ever driven on the streets of Lagos? The last time I was driven through the streets of Lagos in 2009, I tried to find and count the number of commuter buses without a single dent on it. I couldn’t. I also tried to see if drivers would stop at traffic lights, if you could find them. Few did. I will never forget the taxi ride to the airport – at break-neck speed. My heart was in my palm, thumping. Obviously, driving in Lagos would be much, much safer if all drivers obey traffic laws. But the federal government couldn’t ensure that. It built itself a new capital at Abuja and FLED from Lagos!
This road analogy can be applied to the general Nigerian or most African societies. In any organized society, there is a body of rules and regulations which EVERYONE must obey and follow if the society is to survive, rejuvenate itself and progress. A society cannot exist without rules and principles that govern relationships between a person and other persons, the community, and the environment as well as handle problems that may arise within these relationships. A set of such rules, codified or not, may be termed “law.” Six may be distinguished: Natural, contractual, statutory, customary, religious, constitutional laws.
Natural law constitutes the body of rules people must follow in order to live and work in peace. First, they must avoid physical harm or damage to another’s work and property. Second, they must honor their obligations or contracts with others, and, third, they should compensate those on whom they inflict harm and whose property they damage. When people conduct their lives in this “live and let live” way, the natural order of human world is respected. There is peace and natural law prevails. The human world consists of many separate individuals, each capable of feeling, thought, speech, and action. Inevitable interactions create a web of inter-relationships and boundaries that separate one person from another in his words, works, and actions from those of other persons. When people respect that order and the boundaries that define it, they act justly – justice being nothing else than the will to respect the order of the human world and to recognize in word and action what belongs to another.
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When people act justly, they refrain from treating another person as something other than a person or as some person other than he is and from treating what belongs to one person’s as if it belonged to another. They minimize and may even eliminate confusion about who said, did, or produced what. This in turn makes it possible to attribute responsibility, praise and blame, merit and demerit, to whom it is due. Thus, when people behave justly, they do not threaten one another’s life, freedom, or property, but act towards one another in peaceful, friendly ways. (van Notten, 2001; p.14). There are some groups who prefer natural law to laws promulgated by the state. For more, see this link: http://jim.com/rights.html
A contract creates a set of binding rules but it applies to only those who have specifically agreed to it. It is rather limited in its scope and does not empower a signatory to infringe upon the rights of others who are not party to the contract. The “contract” may be a verbal agreement or a promise to repay a loan in the presence of a “witness” and actions to be taken in case of default.
Statutory laws are “rules of conduct designed by government employees, legislated by a parliament, promulgated by a government official such as a king or a minister, and enforced by a police force controlled by that official” (van Notten, 2001; p.16). The police typically have a monopoly over the use of force or the weapons required for redressing injustices. In a dictatorship, statutory laws are decrees or diktats of the ruling despot. In a democracy, statutory law is “politician’s law.” The people have little say in its design, promulgation and enforcement. Their representatives do so in their behalf but there is no guarantee that they will do so or promulgate laws that protect life, liberty and property. Statutory laws can be oppressive. “While these powers (laws) are supposed to be used to defend every person’s right to life, liberty and property, the truth of the matter is that they are regularly used to restrict those very rights. Politicians do this with impunity by first establishing a monopoly over the country’s policing powers” (Heath, 2001).
Customary laws are not commands or legislated rules. They “are conventions and enforceable rules that have emerged and are respected spontaneously, without formal agreement, among people as they go about their daily business and try to solve the problems that occasionally arise in it without upsetting the patterns of cooperation on which they so heavily depend” (van Notten, 2006; p.15). Customary law does not mean every custom is recognized as “law.” However, when a particular custom is repeatedly recognized in a traditional court, it may become law.
A demonstrator, felled by police bullet.
Religious laws are by definition those laws that are derived from the Bible or the Qu’ran. For example, the Ten Commandments and the Sharia lay down laws, enjoining their followers to obey. Many of them are straight-forward injunctions such as “Do not steal.”
A Constitution may be regarded as a social contract between the rulers or government and the governed. Constitutional laws are those derived from the Constitution and when freely negotiated, is the law of the people, defining how their society is to be organized and governed. Constitutional laws specify the rights of the people and the limits of government. They are supreme, taking precedence over all laws. They are also sovereign, meaning they cannot be abrogated by one individual or political party with a majority in Parliament. The supremacy of Constitution law is due to the fact that a nation may be composed of different ethnic and religious groups. While each group may have its own particular laws, there must be one law – Constitution – that keeps or is binding on all groups within the nation.
Thus, every society must have some body of laws to govern itself by. For example, one does not arbitrarily go and steal or seize someone else’s property. All societies disallow that. Nor does one grab, rape and impregnate a woman if one wants to have a child. When everyone obeys and follows the same law, “the rule of law” is said to prevail, meaning it is the law that rules, not the whims of some autocrat. Thus, it is this body of principles and rules – or the rule of law — that stands between sanity or progress in the society and utter chaos or anarchy. Similarly, traffic laws are what stand between sanity and order on the roads and total chaos and carnage.
The rule of law is not something that is alien to Africa. Each traditional African society also has a body of principles and rules which everyone – including chiefs and kings – must follow. It is called customary law. It may cover a wide area — from nationality, land, chattels, marriage, testamentary disposition, defamation to modes of enforcing payment of debts. For example, ownership is generally recognized as arising from original acquisition or legitimate transfer by way of gift, purchase, etc. When a person applied his labor, superior mental powers or business skills to a piece of previously un-owned land and generated a product or developed an artistic motif, traditional law allow them to retain ownership of such land, product or motif.
A mass protest in Nigeria.
In traditional Africa, one did not take the law into one own hands. There are customary ways of resolving disputes. A dispute may be taken to native courts – called gacaca in Rwanda – for a resolution. Among the Arusha of Tanzania, “there was a very strongly held value that disputes should be settled peacefully by persuasion and by resort to the established procedures for settlement” (Carlston, 1968:310). Similarly, the Tallensi of Ghana abhorred killings and violent resolutions of conflicts. For precisely this reason, they celebrated the Golib festival, during which all feuds and hostilities between clans were prohibited. This festival emphasized “the themes of food, harmony, fecundity, and the common interests of the people as a whole” (Carlston, 1968:109).
Customary laws enjoin respect for elders and parents, especially mothers. The elders are regarded as the fonts of wisdom and experience, while mothers are regarded as the pillars of society. This is captured by the African proverb: “Educate a man and you educate a single person but educate a woman and you educate an entire nation.”
Everyone, including chiefs and kings, are required to obey customary law. Even in the rigidly-controlled Kingdom of Dahomey in ancient times, Boahen and Webster (1970) found that,
“Although the king’s word was the law of the land yet he was not above the law. Dahomeans like to recount how king Glele was fined for breaking the law. When gangs of men were working cooperatively either on state roads or building a house for one of their members, it was a law that a passerby must approach the leader and make an excuse as to why he could not break his journey to assist in the work. Permission was almost inevitably given, the law being largely designed to reinforce courtesy. King Glele’s procession passed one such group without asking to be excused. He was stopped by the headman and fined many cases of rum and pieces of cloth for breaking the law…The fact that the kings of Dahomey (now Benin) were prepared to obey the laws they themselves created was the difference between arbitrary despotism and despotism which realized that its power and position rested ultimately, no matter how indirectly, upon the will of the people (p.108).
Traditional African custom required that the elders, the “old men” instruct the youth in native law and custom. As instructors, the elders were expected to be of good behavior and comport themselves well to serve as role models for the youth. Consequently, contraventions of the law by elders were viewed more seriously and punished more severely because the elders were expected “to know the law.” Consider the following cases from Schapera (1957):
Among the Kgatla, a man who had refused on demand to give up cattle that he was looking after for someone else was not only ordered to do so, but was also fined, `because he is an old man and ought to know the law’ (Kgamanyane Pilane v. Ntwai Moeng, 22/1938).
In a matrimonial dispute among the Ngwato, the husband’s conduct was found especially reprehensible , `because he is an old man, from whom younger people should learn how to behave’ (Dikeledi v. Makgoeng, 153/1938).
And in another Ngwato case, a village headman who had abducted another’s wife was fined more heavily than usual because in his position he was expected to set a good example to others (Monyanda v. Radipitse, 151/1938).
The chaos and carnage in modern-day Somalia is a telling example of what happens to a society when some groups refuse to abide by the SAME law. The road analogy is even more pertinent and applicable here: Somalia is a country where some groups refuse to obey the same traffic laws.
The Somali are ethnically homogenous and proud people. They are fiercely republican andbase their society on their customary law called xeer. They refuse to accept an alien system imposed upon them. Heath (2001) expressed it well:
“Most Somalis prefer their customary laws and institutions, which they call xeer. In their experience, the xeer constitutes the heart of the Somali nation. They believe that without the xeer the Somali nation would fall apart, lose its identity, forgo its solidarity, forfeit its civilization and relinquish its culture. The xeer is the cord holding the house of the Somali people together. Indeed, it is thanks to their customary law that the traditional political system of the Somalis took the form of a kritarchy, not a democracy.
But Somali politicians had other ideas. They hold the xeer in abject contempt and prefer contrived statutory law which will allow them to lord over the people. As van Notten (2006) noted:
“During the 20th century, the Somalis were subjected the heavy-handed policies of the colonial powers. These powers left a form of government behind that was at odds with indigenous Somali political culture. It took the Somalis 30 years to get rid of it and return to their pre-colonial political structure. Many problems arose in the course of this, but gradually the Somalis are resolving them. Foreign observers fail to understand what they are doing; they think the Somalis have been trying to establish a democratic government and constantly failing to do so. In reality, the chief aim of many Somalis is to clean their indigenous legal and political system of its foreign elements (p.139).
In short, the crisis and carnage in Somalia is due to a clash of laws. Not all are following the SAME traffic laws. The Somali prefer the customary law, the xeer. The colonialists, political elites and the Islamists prefer other laws. When the colonialist tried to impose their own laws on the Somali, they fought them and gained their independence. When dictators and political elites tried to impose decrees and statutory laws on them, the Somali fought them too and drove dictator General Siad Barre out of office into exile. Obviously, if the Islamist group, al-Shabaab, tries to impose the sharia on the Somali, they will fight it too.
Clearly, the solution to the crisis in Somalia does not lie in having a strongman impose the Ten Commandments on the people; they will fight it. Nor does it lie in breaking up the country. For one thing, the Somali are a one-tribe nation (ethnically homogenous), so one can’t have one tribe going this way and the others going the other way. Even then, Puntland and Somaliland broke away but no country has recognized them. The obvious solution is get ALL Somali to obey the SAME traffic laws.
Now, which LAW must ALL Nigerians follow and obey: Natural Law, Statutory Law, The Ten Commandments, The Sharia, or The Constitutional Law? If you said, the Constitutional Law, you are right but has it been followed? And what happens when the president holds the Constitution in vexatious contempt, refuses to follow it and blurts, “I don’t give a dam”?
Part 2
The Constitutional Vacuum
Customary law is the cord that keeps a traditional society together; the Constitution is the yarn that weaves the fabric of a modern state together. Without it, a nation becomes an anarchy or a police state in which citizens have no guaranteed rights or freedoms and their obligations to the state are not defined. Also ill-defined or non-existent are the functions of state organs or institutions, such as parliament, the judiciary and the security forces. Under a constitution, parliament, for example, provides oversight over executive actions and the role of the judiciary is to ensure that the rule of law is upheld. Without a constitution, there is no oversight over the executive, which means the head of state can literally do whatever he wants. Further, without a constitution, there is no law for the judiciary to uphold except decrees or diktaks from the executive. More importantly, democracy, separation of powers, checks and balances are all non-existent without a constitution. Neither are the principles of accountability, transparency and probity which vanish completely because there is no rule which stipulates how the head of state, the chief justice or the police chief should be chosen or held accountable and by whom.
The absence of a constitution also has deleterious economic consequences. The constitution defines the parameters within which economic activity can take place. Since there isn’t one, nobody is sure what constitutes a legitimate business activity or not and uncertainty prevails, which discourages investment – the key to economic growth and development. This creates a situation where hordes of businessmen must seek “approval” from the head of state before undertaking a venture and the head of state, often crooked, may demand a bribe or percentage share of the business before granting approval. Even business contracts become meaningless. Suppose a businessman wins a contract to construct roads. Half-way through the contract, suppose the government arbitrarily cancels the contract. Under a constitution, he may sue the government for breach of contract but there is no constitution. He might take the case to court anyway but there is no constitution which authorizes the court to hear such cases. Or the president can order the judge to throw the case out.
Socially and more generally, a nation’s life hangs in abeyance when there is no constitution. Since there are no clearly defined rules or laws, uncertainty prevails. Nobody is sure about what is legal and illegal or how to deal with one another. In such a situation, people or groups may fall back on their traditional (customary) laws, religious laws or make up their own “laws” as they go along. The police, civil servants, armed robbers and even scammers may do so as well. A tapestry of “laws” comes into existence and applied an ad hoc basis. There is no predictability as these ad hoc laws can change suddenly. Inevitably, a clash of laws frequently occurs. Ordinarily, a constitution resolves such clashes but there isn’t one, which means they must be resolved by the head of state. And when one is dissatisfied with his verdict, there is no guaranteed right of appeal.
More pernicious and incurably damaging are the effects on the youth. In the absence of a constitution, they grow up without knowing the principles and values that serve as a glue holding the nation together. They don’t know what is right or wrong and what is social or anti-social. These young people become increasingly confused, disaffected, lost, and restless. Poorly educated and jobless, they have few role models with moral stature. The value system has collapsed because there are no values celebrated by a constitution. Hard work and entrepreneurship no longer assure success and wealth because what one builds can be wiped out in an instant because there is no rule of law.
Disenchanted by their own society, the youth become susceptible to radical ideas and drift toward religious extremists — not just the Islamist fanatics in northern Nigeria and Somalia, but also the Christian variety (the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda) and the traditionalist (the Mungiki sect in Kenya). Some seek escape in rickety boats to Europe. Others turn to crime (drug trafficking, Internet scams), prostitution, and extremist groups that seek violent change.
In sum, the absence of a constitution breeds lawlessness, government dysfunction and retards economic development. The moral and value system collapses in a constitutional vacuum. The youth become disoriented and lost. It is like driving on a road without traffic laws. One would be lucky to reach one’s destination in one piece.
Military Rule in Nigeria – No Constitution, No Rule of Law
After seizing power, the first thing a military junta does is to suspend the constitution. Libya is the African country that holds the record on such suspension. After seizing power in 1969, Col. Muammar Khaddafi ruled without a constitution for 41 years. Togo is next, checking in with 38 years. Nigeria clocks in third with 29 years of military rule without a constitution. Here is the slate of military dictators that ruled the country:
• GENERAL Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Jan 16 to July 29, 1966
• GENERAL Yakubu Gowon, Aug 1, 1966 to 29 July 1975
• GENERAL Murtala Mohammed, July 29, 1975 to Feb 13, 1976
• GENERAL Olusegun Obasanjo, Feb 13, 1976 to Oct 1, 1979
• GENERAL Muhammadu Buhari, Dec 31, 1983 to Aug 27, 1985
• GENERAL Ibrahim Babangida, 27 Aug 27, 1985 to Aug 26, 1993
• GENERAL Sani Abacha, Nov 17, 1993 to June 8, 1998
• GENERAL Abdulsalami Abubakar, June 8,1998 to May 29, 1999
All were generals. From Jan 16, 1966 to March 1999 – a period of 33 years, the military monopolized power except when briefly interrupted by the civilian government of Shehu Shagari (Oct 1, 1979 to Dec 31, 1983) and the three-month interim administration by Ernest Shonekan (Aug 26 – Nov 17, 1993), leaving 29 years under military rule. It was during this period that the destruction of the Nigerian state began.
Reckless government spending by military vagabonds squandered away Nigeria’s oil bonanza. There was no constitution or institution to check government profligacy. The economy tanked in 1986, forcing the Babangida regime to seek relief from the World Bank to address the economic crisis. But one crisis after another followed each other. The currency, the naira –once the strongest in West Africa – collapsed. By 1993, the banking system was on the verge of collapse.
State institutions began to decay and crumble. Government ministries failed to deliver basic social services such as clean water, health care, sanitation, education and electricity. Nigeria’s Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was nicknamed “Never Ever Power Again.” Institutions such as the Police and the Judiciary deteriorated. The social fabric of Nigeria – whatever was left of it – began to shred, the government ceased to function, the moral and value system started to collapse, corruption began to spiral out of control and a whole generation of Nigerians was lost. In historical terms, 25 years is generally considered a “generation.” Therefore, a whole generation of Nigerians was reared without knowing the constitution, its value or significance. About 60 percent of Nigerians today are under 40 years old, meaning the vast majority were raised in a constitutional vacuum. People hold the government in abject contempt, regarding the government as irrelevant in their lives. Said Simon Agbo, a farmer in Ogbadibo, south of Makurdi, Benue state capital: “I heard we have a new government. It makes no difference to me. Here we have no light [electricity], we have no water. There is no road. We have no school. The government does nothing for us” (The Washington Times, Oct 21, 1999; p.A19).
By 1998, Nigeria was a certified coconut republic where common sense had been butchered and arrogant idiocy was on the rampage. There was no rule of law; bandits were in charge and the victims in jail. The state-mobile was essentially kaput. Nigeria, then, was a thoroughly wasted nation. So much potential, such wealth in natural resources and such dynamism in its people but all squandered. Said Linus U. J. Thomas-Ogboji, a Nigerian scholar:
“Nigeria, the comatose giant of Africa, may go down in history as the biggest country ever to go directly from colonial subjugation to complete collapse, without an intervening period of successful self-rule. So much promise, so much waste; such a disappointment. Such a shame. Makes you sick” (African News Weekly (26 May 1995, 6).
Former head of state, Gen. Abdusallam Abubakar, himself admitted the serious economic deterioration for the country as a whole: “Every human-welfare and development index measuring the well-being of our people is on the decline. Currently, we are the world’s 13th-poorest nation. Given our resource endowments, this sorry state is a serious indictment” (The Economist, 29 August 1998, 45). Nigerian scholar Felix Oti lamented that:
“We have come to be regarded as empty vessels that make a lot of noise. There is a difference between academic intelligence and common sense. The latter is the motor that effectively and successfully drives the application of the former. Unfortunately, the average Nigerian intellectual, though overwhelmed with the former, fails to exhibit enough of the latter to be taken seriously. The very same squabble is just a replica of what is, and has been, going on in the Mother continent — the inability to put heads together and form a united front; the root cause of Africa’s many problems (African News Weekly, 21 April 1995, 22).
Recall that the situation in Nigeria and many African countries can be described as: Bad driver, bad vehicle, bad roads and ANGRY passengers FED UP with lack of progress. Changing the driver without fixing the vehicle is pointless as the new driver would also land in another ditch. But since the 1970s, that is exactly what has been taking place. The dilapidated state vehicle remains kaput.
Reckless Government Spending
The discovery and exploration of oil fields in the early 1970s led to a booming economy. Oil quickly became the dominant sector of the economy, accounting for more than 90 percent of exports and providing the federal government with 80 percent of its revenue. As money flowed into Nigerian government coffers, military dictators went on a spending spree. They frittered away the oil bonanza on extravagant investment projects — a new capital at Abuja with a price tag of $25 billion, and highly ambitious Third Development Plans, upon the false projections of oil output and revenue. Agriculture was neglected and food imports rose rapidly. There was no accounting system as there was no constitution.
In 1981, oil prices fell precipitously. Export receipts plummeted from $22 billion in 1980 to $10 billion in 1983 and then to $6 billion in 1986. To maintain income and the consumption binge, Nigeria borrowed heavily. Its foreign debts quadrupled from $9 billion in 1980 to $36 billion in 1990. Federal and state budgets sank into deficits. These were financed with the accumulation of more debt and the depletion of international reserves. External imbalance caused difficulties with debt servicing and forced the country to go into arrears.
To help improve balance, the Economic Stabilization Act of 1982 was passed by the civilian Shagari administration. Stringent trade controls, the rationing of foreign exchange, a restriction on import licenses, an increase in duties, and the initiation of an import deposit program were adopted. These measures however failed miserably and an economic crisis emerged in 1983. Growth rates turned sharply negative. The GDP growth rate in 1983 was -6.7 percent; non-oil sector growth fell to -9.3 percent and petroleum sector growth to -2.5 percent. By 1985, the distortions in the economy had reached alarming proportions. The exchange rate was grossly overvalued and the budget deficit out of control. The government resorted to heavy domestic borrowing from the banking system to finance its profligacy.
Economic Ruination
The supreme irony about Nigeria’s economic development is that, despite the flow of substantial oil wealth, the country entered the new millennium with real income per capita of about $290 today, which is nearly the same as it was at independence in 1960 and saddled with a foreign debt of $30 billion. About 60 percent of Nigeria’s population live on less than a $1 a day. The drop was more dramatic in the 1980s during military rule. In 1980, income per capita stood at $1029—the fifth highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 1990, it had dropped to a woeful $266. This sharp decline in economic performance was not due to external economic adversities but to grotesque mismanagement and brazen, unprincipled looting.
Back in the 1960s, 70 percent of Nigeria’s 110 million people lived on agriculture and the country was a major exporter of food. Benue state was known as the “food basket of the nation.” By 2000, Nigeria exports only cocoa, rubber and palm products and imports rice, corn, wheat and sugar (The Washington Times, April 13, 2000; p.A17). The value of food imports reached $3 billion in 2005.
The Collapse of the Naira
To stem the tide of inflation and rescue the economy, Maj-General Buhari changed the currency in 1984. It was a replication of a resounding policy folly by an economically illiterate military dictator, Fte./Lte. Jerry Rawlings in Ghana.
In February 1982, the military government of Ghana (the Provisional National Defense Council—PNDC) demonetized the 50 cedi note. The public was asked to deposit these notes in their banks in return for chits that were supposed to be redeemed later but never were as it was a ruse. Ghana shut its borders for two years. The official reasons were: to mop up excess liquidity in the system, to crack down on tax evasion, to punish corrupt politicians, and to render useless large amounts of the currency circulating outside the country. Additionally, the exercise was intended to crush currency smuggling and thereby shore up the external value of the currency. The government insisted that “the withdrawal of the 50 cedi note was not against the poor or the genuine rich but rather it was meant to withdraw excess liquidity in the hands of a few greedy and corrupt businessmen” (Daily Graphic, Feb 24, 1982; p.1). The other official reason for the currency change was to reduce excess liquidity in the banking system and ease inflationary pressures.
However, this was criminally dishonest. Borrowing from the central bank to finance soaring budget deficits was the primary source of excess liquidity in the system. Even Ghana’s own 1978-79 budget statement admitted that “over the past 5 years, more than 70 percent of every budget has been financed by the Bank of Ghana, resulting in the injection of substantial amounts of money into the economy” (p.2; paragraph 6).
On February 13, 1982, exactly one day after the deadline for the deposit of the demonetized 50 cedi notes in Ghanaian banks, the PNDC announced that those whose bank balances exceeded 50,000 cedis would be subject to investigative probes to determine their compliance with tax obligations. In one stroke, this inane policy shattered confidence in the currency and dealt a devastating blow to the banking system, from which it took decades to recover. Traders and innocent farmers, who had toiled and placed their savings in old currency under mattresses, suddenly found them worthless because they could not meet the deadline. Billions of the old currency were thrown into rivers.
In 1984, the Buhari administration copied exactly the same idiotic measure and in one stroke destroyed the value of the naira. At that time in the 1980s, the naira was even stronger than the dollar. It was the preferred currency for trading in West Africa. To facilitate trade and convertibility, most traders plying West African routes carried naira.
The official reason for changing the currency was that “there was too much money in circulation” (West Africa, May 28, 1984; p.1106). Nigeria’s Central Bank director of domestic operations at the time, Chief Nwagu, argued that the change was necessary to demonetize the N2 billion illegally acquired by corrupt politicians and held outside the country (West Africa, May 28, 1984; p.1107). But the fact of the matter is, when corrupt politicians rape and plunder their country, they take the booty out in foreign exchange, not in naira.
When Nigerians deposited their old currency to exchange for the new one, “persons who had deposited up to N5,000 were informed they would have to produce their tax clearance certificates, showing that they paid their taxes over the last 3 years, before they could be allowed to withdraw any money” (West Africa, May 28, 1984; p.1108). This was exactly the same ruse military dictator, Rawlings pulled off in Ghana. The Buhari regime changed the currency and sealed the country’s borders, ostensibly to “catch big-time hoarders who had tucked money away overseas” (West Africa, May 28, 1984; p.1108). Nigeria reopened its borders in March 1986 after two years of closure.
Those who take the local currency out of the country are generally illiterate traders and migrant workers who have no access to foreign exchange at the central banks and therefore use whatever currency that is acceptable to trade along the West African coast. Why should these innocent traders be punished for the actions of corrupt politicians?
When “the news of the exercise (50 cedi note demonetization) leaked out, many people in Accra and other parts of the country went on shopping spree, before the Feb 12 deadline to get rid of their notes” (West Africa, Feb 22, 1982; p.536). Exactly the same phenomenon was observed in Nigeria: “Several people went on spending sprees, buying among other things, cars, air-line tickets, anything that could later be sold” (West Africa, May 24, 1984; p.1106).
In Nigeria, the public responded similarly — shunning the banking system – just like in Ghana. To attract funds, banks offered fantastic rates for short-term deposits — 6 months or less. The banks had considerable difficulty attracting funds for long term. In both countries, loss of confidence and flight from the currency, also drove people to hold foreign currencies, which they could only obtain at the black market. The results were soaring black market rates and thus declining external value of the currency — a result clearly opposite to what the currency change was intended to achieve. Within one year, the black market rate for the cedi jumped from 40 to 100 to the dollar. In Jan 1995, the rate was 1,200 cedis to the dollar. In Nigeria, N1 exchanged for a dollar in the early 1980s. By Jan, 1995, it had reached N100. The naira, whichwas the preferred legal tender among West African traders, lost its pre-eminence because traders who held large amounts of old naira outside Nigeria suffered heavy losses because they could not get into Nigeria to exchange the old for the new naira as the borders were closed.
The currency change exercises in both Ghana and Nigeria were maddening. If the military juntas wanted to mop up excess liquidity from the system, they should have looked at their own profligate government spending. According to Ralph Osayameh, president of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, “The cause of that is government expenditure” (West Africa, Feb 1-7, 1993; p.153).
And if they wanted to catch corrupt politicians, they should have gone after those gallivanting under their very noses. What did innocent traders and peasant farmers have to do with excess liquidity and corruption for them to be punished by rendering their savings in the old currencies worthless? If a genuine currency change is necessary, there should be no deadline, nor should the borders be closed. As it was, the change was not genuine but a ruse.
Nigerians chose to keep their money balances outside the country after the currency change. Who would keep their savings in a Nigerian bank and be subjected to probes by military coconut-heads? The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company estimated that Nigeria’s foreign debt of $32 billion would have been only $7 billion had there been no capital flight (Business Week, April 21, 1986; p. 14). Capital flight accelerated in the 1980s as policy zig-zags further undermined confidence in the banking system. By 1990, as the Lagos National Concord (Aug 16, 1990) reported, the staggering sum of $32 billion owned by Nigerians in foreign bank accounts was equivalent to Nigeria’s huge foreign debt. As a result, commercial banks in Nigeria still have difficulty attracting deposits, having to offer spectacular rates for short-term deposits — 6 months or less.
Buhari was overthrown by General Babangida, who seized power in 1985, but he was no better in terms of economic management. He respected no rules. Laid-down budgetary procedures were flagrantly skirted by top government officials. In 1986, Gen. Babangida publicly bragged that Nigeria would never seek any relief from the IMF or the World Bank. Then his administration secretly signed a SAP agreement with the IMF to rein in extra-budgetary spending and escalating defense expenditures. But even before the ink on that accord had dried, he had started the formation of his own private army (called the National Guards). He ignored the agreement and showered the officers of the Armed Forces with gifts of cars worth half a billion naira. In July 1992, his military regime took delivery of 12 Czechoslovakian jet trainers (Aero L-39 Albatros) in a secret deal believed to be part of a larger order made in 1991 year and worth more than $90 million. Earlier in 1992, Nigeria had taken delivery of 80 British Vickers Mark 3 tanks, worth more than $225 million.
Heavy outlays were made on grandiose investment projects with little economic viability. Among them is the Ajaokuta Steel Plant, which was commissioned in 1979. It cost more than $3 billion, never produced a single sheet of steel and was eventually grounded in the 1980s. Another was the Aluminium Smelter Project at Ikot Abasi at a cost of $1.2 billion — 60 percent more costly than a comparable project elsewhere in the world.
In August, 1987, Gen. Babangida limited debt-service ratio at 30 percent of export revenue, sending foreign investors scampering for cover. On March 5, 1992, the foreign exchange market was deregulated but in December, trading was suspended for about a week to probe irregularities. Foreign exchange controls were re*-imposed in Oct 1993 when Gen. Sani Abacha seized power. Believing in the power of the gun rather than the market, he fixed the value of the naira at N22 to the dollar. Interest rates were also pegged, stifling bank profitability and pushing several banks to the brink of financial collapse. In Jan 1995, Gen. Abacha reintroduced the second-tier system, leaving the official rate fixed at N22 to the dollar while the rate on the parallel (autonomous) market was N80. Nothing, it seemed, had been learned.
By Jan 1988, the Structural Adjustment program had stalled. The banking system was in disarray. Financial controls were either non-existent or hopelessly ineffective. To finance its reckless spending the Babangida administration borrowed heavily from both the commercial and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), injecting excess money into the economy. The money supply registered a staggering 43.9 percent growth, against a ceiling of 15 percent. The rate of inflation accelerated. In March 1989, the rate was 45 percent compared to 25 percent a year earlier. Were these not the same reasons why the currency was changed in 1984 – to mop up excess liquidity? A banking crisis was looming.
Part 3
Collapse of the Banking System
During this period under military rule, there was no rule of law. No one followed any law; building contractors made up their own “laws” as did bankers. In November 1992, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) declared 46 banks as “insolvent.” Alhaji Abdulkadir Ahmed, the CBN governor, “pinpointed huge debts that are doubtful or bad, fraud and forgeries, boardroom quarrels and inept management” (West Africa, Feb 1-7, 1993; p.148). The governor explained further that:
“Most Nigerian banks, especially the state-owned ones, have poor loan portfolios — for state government-owned commercial banks, the proportion of classified loans (bad and doubtful) was 66.3 percent in 1991; while the proportion of privately-owned banks was 32 percent, and for merchant banks (all privately owned) the classified loan portfolio was only 27 percent (West Africa, Feb 1-7, 1993; p.148).
Fraud soon started to threaten the integrity and stability of the banking system. Between 1988 and 1990, fraud cases rose 800 percent. In 1991, for example, a total of N360.2 million was lost. Of this, the loss to privately-owned commercial banks was N25.5 million and N28.3 million for merchant banks. The bulk was incurred by state-owned banks. In May, 1993, the CBN took over the management of five state-owned banks: African Continental Bank, Cooperative & Commerce Bank, Mercantile Bank of Nigeria, New Nigeria Bank and Pan-African Bank. In January, 1994, the CBN revoked the operational licences of two banks (Financial Merchant Bank and Kapital Merchant Bank) for “total erosion of their capital bases and dissipation of the depositors’ funds” (African Business, May 1994; p.31). Three weeks later, the Republican Bank Limited and Broad Bank of Nigeria Limited, were suspended. But few of the fraudsters were prosecuted as most had fled the country.
To bring sanity into the banking system, both the government and the CBN resorted to desperate ad hoc measures to mop up excess liquidity. On April 5, 1989, the CBN it issued a directive that the commercial and merchant banks should within 21 days recall all loans and advances with offshore guarantees and collaterals, since such loans were guaranteed with foreign exchange that should have been repatriated. About N1.03 billion (or $144 million) was involved. The directive sent panic in the banking system. Nineteen banks could not comply with the 21-day ultimatum.
In May 1989, the government followed CBN action by ordering all government agencies’ to withdraw their funds from commercial and merchant banks and other non-bank financial institutions. This order “spread fears that some banks were about to collapse” (African Business, Oct 1989; p.25). Panic set in, triggering a run on the banks. Though the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation was established in 1988 to protect depositors against bank failures, only N5,000 was covered, exposing large depositors to bank failures. “One notable multi-millionaire caused panic when he gave his bank the mandatory seven days’ notice to withdraw his N200 million ” (African Business, Oct 1989; p.25).
To be fair, the CBN’s culpability in the banking crisis was limited. With a gun pointed at its head, it lacked room for independent action. Even when it took an independent action, this could always be overridden by the marauding federal government hijacked by a military junta. But the CBN exacerbated the banking crisis with its own autocratic style of management. In April, 1993, CBN yanked a whopping N33 billion ($1.31 billion) from the vaults of the banks.
Before banks could recover from the cash squeeze, CBN introduced Open Market Operations, selling N250 million in Treasury Bills. But in late August, CBN reversed itself and “released N1.5 billion in the form of loans to bail out 14 banks which were adversely affected by the withdrawal of government funds from the banks” (African Business, Oct 1989; p.26). But “By Sept 1, 1993, literally all the banks were unable to meet their obligations to customers. Depositors were in most cases not allowed to withdraw amounts in excess of N1,000 (in some cases, even less), irrespective of their credit balances” (African Business, Oct 1993; p.17). The banking system had in effect collapsed.
Decay of State Institutions
State institutions and commissions became paralyzed. Laxity, ineptitude, indiscipline and unprofessionalism thus flourished in the public sector. Of course, Nigeria had a police force and judiciary system to catch and prosecute the thieves. But the police were themselves highway robbers, under orders to protect the looters, and many of the judges were themselves crooks.
“On Oct 16, 2001, armed robbers had operated for about four hours along the Osogbo-Ikirun road, dispossessing their victims of valuables. Villagers in the area subsequently mobilized themselves and descended on the suspected robbers. They were however shocked, according to reports, to discover that the persons caught at the scene were a police inspector and other policemen. “When the policemen were accosted, they fled into the bush abandoning their vehicle. The inspector was however caught and subsequently beaten up by the angry villagers. Reports of the armed robbery prompted police authority to send two patrol teams to the scene, but on arrival, the teams were attacked by the mob who accused them of complicity in the robbery operation. A total of three police vehicles with registration numbers PF 5737, PF 5730 and PF 5660 involved in the whole incident were all lying in the bush at the scene” (The Guardian, October 17, 2001).
In another case, “Two Nigerian policemen were among a gang of eight armed robbers arrested as they attempted to snatch cars passing a major Lagos bridge. Police Assistant Superintendent Paddy Ogon said the two, whom he declined to name, stopped cars crossing the 3rd Mainland Bridge linking Lagos island and the continent while their accomplices forced the passengers out, robbed them and snatched the cars. Acting on a tipoff, police stationed detectives at points overlooking the bridge and caught the robbers and their police colleagues redhanded, he said” (Daily Times, 11 August, 1998; p.3).
“Nigeria had many fine lawyers, but the judiciary is tainted by trials settled with bribes. It had fine academics, but universities were tarnished by the trade in diplomas. It had respected chiefs, but the nobility had been mocked by the sale of chieftaincy titles. In many ways, the institution which has suffered the most under this military regime was the military itself. `Military men are not soldiers anymore’ is a common Nigerian observation (The Economist, 21 August 1993; Survey, 6). Nigerian cities have fire departments, but often there is no equipment. When a three-story apartment building and a bakery were destroyed by fire in Umuahia “one volunteer, Mr. Timothy Nwachukwu, said that the fire service did not help because they had no working vehicles” (African News Weekly, 24 February 1994, 12).
Institutional break-down and the failure to provide the most basic essential services created an environment inimical to development. The cost of doing business in such an environment increased enormously. Simple, routine applications took weeks to be approved. Security of persons and property could seldom be guaranteed. Increasing production became chancy, given intermittent disruptions in the supply of electricity and water.
There were no checks against brigandage. The worst was the military — the most trenchantly perverted institution in Nigeria. In any normal, civilized society, the function of the military is to defend the territorial integrity of the nation and the people against external aggression. In Nigeria, the military was instead locked in combat with the very people it was supposed to defend. Wole Soyinka (1996) handed the postcolonial soldiers a blistering rebuke:
“The military dictatorships of the African continent, parasitic, unproductive, totally devoid of social commitment or vision, are an expression of this exclusionist mentality of a handful; so are those immediately postcolonial monopolies that parade themselves as single-party states. To exclude the sentient plurality of any society from the right of decision in the structuring of their own lives is an attempt to anesthetize, turn comatose, indeed idiotize society, which of course is a supreme irony, since the proven idiots of our postcolonial experience have been, indeed still are, largely to be found among the military dictators.” (139).
A simple rule of thumb on Nigerian development emerged: The index of economic well-being of the country was inversely related to the length of time the military held political power. The longer it stayed in power, the greater the economic devastation. Said African News Weekly in its September 1, 1995 editorial:
“No military coup in Africa has produced a vibrant economy to replace the bankrupt one it set out to redeem. In almost every case, the army boys have imbibed the ways of the corrupt politicians they pushed out of office and even taken their crookedness to a higher level” (7).
Fed up with their antics, West Africa magazine, in its June 20-26, 1994 issue, offered them this advice:
“Military people belong in the barracks not in the corridors of political power. Since independence, Nigeria has had an obscenely high number of military governments; they cited corruption and waste if taking over from a civilian government and something else if overthrowing another military junta. Needless to say, the Nigerian populace is fed up. The armed forces cannot claim not to realize this. If a soldier should become bored, he can always go and play ping pong; it is good for keeping fit. (1078)
The military soon became the most thoroughly discredited institution. A Nigerian pro-democracy activist, Arthur Nwanko, wrote devastatingly from jail:
“National wealth and resources have been scandalously pillaged by a band of armed booty-seekers and their retinue of civilian collaborators. Not content with the destruction of the economy; not content with inflicting enormous social dislocations on the polity; not content with raping democracy; people and fundamental rights; not content with institutionalizing corruption as a national art form; and not content with causing the decay of the nation’s agricultural, industrial, and social infrastructure, including the environment, the health and educational system through their planlessness and visionless leadership, these singleminded despots have moved into the area of violating the nation’s honor, sense of worth and dignity, and through that caused the massive debasement of the humanity of Nigerians in the eyes of the rest of civilized humanity” (Post Express Wired,. 17 June 1998).
The longer they stayed in office, the less they had “upstairs,” becoming “hardened coconuts.” In fact, one of them, V.I. Okafor, a retired Nigerian army Captain, confessed: “We are perceived as a class of marauding mediocres, vast in wastefulness, corruption and all sorts of vicious behavior a class devoid of men of honor and integrity, a class enveloped in infamy” (The Vanguard, 14 July 1998, 2). Yet, within six months of assuming power from the late General Sani Abacha, General Abubakar granted himself the country’s highest award, the Grand Commander of the Federal Republic. He also honored all past military heads of state, with the exception of the late General Sani Abacha. Some honor!
Nigeria’s military rulers proved themselves to be most incompetent in handling any task. When they took on the task of shepherding the country through a transition to democratic rule, they rather made the transition process itself permanent! From 1980 the ever-competent military vagabonds tried on NINE occasions to return the country to democratic rule. On the ninth attempt, they even annulled the June 12, 1993 election, which was won by the late Chief Abiola.
A Lagos newspaper, Weekend Concord reported that the Supreme Court judges had accepted Mercedes Benz bribes from head of state, General Babangida for a favorable ruling on the annulment. The judges employed one of Nigeria’s most prominent lawyers, Chief Rotimi Williams, to file libel suits against the paper, claiming $40 million. The Concord objected, complaining that the case would come up before the Supreme Court — that is, the judges would sit in judgment on their own case! But the “Chief Justice ruled that he was competent to hear the case and far from throwing it out, sought an accelerated hearing for the case” (New African, May 1994, 41).
It was during this period that Nigeria’s military regime pompously offered South Africa “technical assistance” for its transition to democratic rule. Mr. Banji Oloruntegbe, the executive secretary of Nigeria’s National Committee Against Apartheid, said that “Nigeria will train 500 black South Africans as part of its technical assistance to the world’s youngest democratic country. The training which will begin soon, will educate South African blacks in the key areas like local government, customs and immigration services, taxation, budget and communication development” (West Africa, June 6-12, 1994; p.1005).
The most egregious display of incompetence occurred in Nov 1995 when Abacha’s military regime set out to hang human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa on trumped-up charges of treason and murder. It took FIVE attempts to execute the dastardly deed because of equipment malfunction. An irate Kwesi Obeng of University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana, wrote “to register his protest and revulsion at the way African leaders have been disgracing the black race. Just look at the way Ken Saro-Wiwa and Co. were hanged like pigs without the benefit of an appeal” (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 18-22 January 1996, 4).
When it comes to beating up and shooting unarmed civilians, Africa’s security forces can do with efficient relish. But how really courageous were the security boys? On July 23, 1998, Colonel Anthony Obi, Osun State’s military administrator, strutted pompously to deliver a speech at a state function at Osogbo in the southwestern part of Lagos. As the Daily Champion (24 July 1998) reported:
“Panic-stricken Nigerian officials ran for safety when first a rat and then a python, apparently drawn by the smell of the rat, made a sudden appearance. The officials leapt up from their seats when the rat, described as having a “long snout and offensive smell,” appeared from beneath the carpet by the high table. Colonel Anthony Obi, Osun State’s military administrator, and his entourage nervously returned after security agents intervened and killed the beast. (p.1)
Part 4
Sham Transitions to Democratic Rule
Without a Constitution, the yarn that weaves a nation together unravels as there is no rule of law, no value system, etc. Everything depends on the whims of the dictator at the top and the weather forecast. For 29 years under military rule, Nigerians had no constitution. Despite the vaunted rhetoric about efficiency, accumulated evidence shows that the military has been the most egregiously incompetent institution to manage a transition to democracy – not just in Africa but elsewhere as well. Witness the military-orchestrated transitions in Tunisia, Egypt or Myanmar (Burma). It was worse in Nigeria.
After seizing power in a military coup in 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida (“The Maradona” – The Dribbler) began a 5-year transition program, which turned out to be a sham odyssey. The program was stretched out with frequent interruptions, devious maneuvers and broken promises (at least four missed handover dates — Oct 1990, Oct 1992, Jan 1993 and June 1993). Just because the U.S. has two major parties, Babangida created exactly two political parties for Nigeria: “one a little to the left and the other a little to the right.” To add insult to injury, he wrote the manifestoes for the two parties too. And when he did not like the June 1993 presidential election results, he promptly annulled them!
Next to shepherd the transition to democracy was General Sani Abacha (“The Butcher of Abuja”), always in Ray-Ban dark goggles. After shoving Ernest Shonekan aside in Nov 1993, Abacha announced preparations for a Constitutional Conference, which also turned out to be a farce. He twice postponed its opening and a day after the conference finally began on June 27, 1994, it was abruptly adjourned for two weeks. The official reason? The delegates’ accommodations were not ready.
Moreover, the 396 delegates, who were to deliberate on the future of democracy, congregated at
Abuja as “guests of the military.” A fourth of their number (96) was nominated by General Abacha himself and the rest “elected” under suspiciously complex rules. Delegates were chosen by “people’s representatives” who were themselves elected by popular vote on 23 May, 1994 postponed from 21 May. Candidates under 35 years of age were ineligible to run. In addition, they must not be “an ex-convict, must be sane, must be a fit and proper person and must not have been declared bankrupt by a court of law” — requirements that most of the ruling military elites themselves would fail to meet.
Logistical problems, inadequate publicity, and apathy bedeviled the electoral exercise. There was no campaigning; no voters register or cards. Confusion reigned. Voters did not even know whom they were voting for and for what purpose. And stunned by the annulment of June 12, 1993 elections, many chose to stay home. The general voter turnout across the country was scandalously low.
More suspiciously, the Constitutional Conference was not sovereign. That is, General Abacha reserved for himself the right to reject or accept its recommendations. If his regime rejected them, the entire exercise would be a colossal waste and started anew. If the recommendations were accepted, the military regime would then draw up a timetable, perhaps another transition period for “civic education,” voter registration, local, state and regional elections with still the possibility of interruptions midstream.
Compared to South Africa’s 1991 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), the differences were glaring. Nigeria’s conference was a meretricious charade that should have been dissolved. Political parties did not take part in the constitutional conference. Imagine de Klerk of South Africa banning the ANC and all political parties, arresting political leaders, clamping down on the news media, nominating 25 percent of the delegates to CODESA, and declaring that its resolutions would not be binding on the white minority government. Eventually, General Abacha abandoned the constitutional conference and allowed just 5 political parties to be registered in 1997. Immediately, they all adopted him as their presidential candidate!
Fake Constitutional Rule
After the timely death of Abacha in 1998, the next to manage the transition to democracy was General Abdulsalam Abubakar. Note the frequency of the title “Generals” in managing the transition. General Abubakar authorized two constitutions to be written for the March 1999 elections but the military brass held the two constitutions closely to their chest — which one to release depended on the election results. In other words, if the election results went this way, they would release Constitution A; it they went the other way, they would release Constitution B. Thus, Nigerians went to vote for General (rtd)) Obasanjo without knowing what the country’s Constitution was.
The entire transition process was a scam. And how real was Nigeria’s transition to democratic rule? Said Rev. Matthew Hassan Kuka, a member of the Oputa Commission set up to investigate past human rights abuses:
“You have a president who is a retired military man, a director of national security who is a retired military man, a defense minister who is a retired military man and a director of the State Security Service (SSS) or national intelligence, who is an ex-military man. Apart from the president and all the key office-holders in the land being of military background, we don’t have enough elbow room to begin to talk about subordinating this system to civilian control” (The Washington Times, Nov 1, 2001; p.A18).
Open Defiance of the Constitution
The first blow to Constitutional rule came just less than a year after President Obasanjo took office in 1999 by governors of the northern states. Many would agree that Islam is a fine religion but its cause has been increasingly hijacked and debauched by zealots and extremists. Nigeria is almost evenly split between northern Muslims (50 percent of the population) and southerners who practice Christianity (40 percent), with some traditional African religions. Religious and ethnic clashes have been a staple of Nigerian life and to avert religious conflict, Nigeria wisely adopted a secular constitution on May 4, 1999. Chapter I, part II, section 10 states: “The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion”. The adoption of the sharia by any state is clearly unconstitutional, except in domestic matters. But several northern states, in defiance of the Constitution, went ahead and adopted the sharia as their state religion anyway. Zamfara first adopted the sharia on October 26, 2002, barely twelve months after President Obasanjo assumed office. It rapidly spread to 12 of Nigeria’s 36 states.
The adoption of the sharia accentuated religious strife and communal violence which claimed more than 10,000 lives by 2002. Christians, Muslims, and others were hacked to death with knives and swords, in conflicts precipitated by the new sharia laws. Churches and mosques were destroyed in Kano. Commenting on the rise of Muslim sharia law in parts of Nigeria, Professor Chinua Achebe lamented: “I am now not optimistic of the benefits that will come to Nigeria because of democracy. We have dug ourselves into sharia; into a situation where we have become a laughing stock of the world, because we are discussing things like stoning women to death in the 21st century” (BBC World News Service, Nov 22, 2002). Dismayed by what he termed “the tragedy of Nigeria”, Achebe reflected on the divisions apparent in modern Nigeria:
“Religious differences have not just been introduced. Muslims and others have always been there, but somehow they didn’t wipe each other out. What is happening today is that some people are using these differences to promote their ambition and this is an abuse of politics. That’s why the selfishness of the elite stands out so clearly” (BBC World News Service, Nov 22, 2002).
Chinua Achebe should have added that what was happening was unconstitutional since the Constitution recognizes no religion as state religion. President Obasanjo could have resolved the issue by having the Supreme Court rule on sharia law. But prevailing wisdom at that time held that he did not want to offend the powerful northern military chiefs or power-brokers who helped him win the presidency. But by not blocking sharia law in the northern states, he opened the door wide open to wholesale violations of the Constitution, which was rendered meaningless. To be sure, there was a Constitution but no one was obeying or following it – not even the government itself and its institutions.
Weak and Ineffective Obasanjo Administration
Upon assuming power on May 29, 1999, President Obasanjo found the country ungovernable. Confidence in the government was near zero; the people had no faith or trust in government. To them, the government was irrelevant and ignored what it said. Since the country had not had a Constitution for 29 years, it was not exactly clear what the functions of the various state institutions were to be. A near government paralysis resulted from wrangling over distribution of power between the executive and the legislative – an issue which should have been resolved by the Constitution. For 18 months (Feb 1999 to August 2000), Nigeria’s 109 senators and 360 representatives passed just five pieces of legislation, including a budget that was held up for five months. They shirked their Constitutional responsibilities and immediately upon taking office, the legislators voted for themselves hefty allowances, including a 5 billion naira ($50 million) furniture allowances for their official residences and offices. The impeached ex-chairman of the Senate from President Obasanjo’s own People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Chuba Okadigbo, was the most predatory:
“As Senate President, he controlled 24 official vehicles but ordered 8 more at a cost of $290,000. He was also found to have spent $225,000 on garden furniture for his government house, $340,000 on furniture for the house itself ($120,000 over the authorized budget); bought without authority a massive electricity generator whose price he had inflated to $135,000; and accepted a secret payment of $208,000 from public funds, whose purpose included the purchase of `Christmas gifts” (New African,, Sept 2000; p.9).
On Nigeria’s 41st Independence Day (Oct 1, 2001), The Vanguard newspaper carried a front-page cartoon showing Nigeria weighed down by foreign debt, corruption, a crashed economy, communal violence and incompetent leadership. In an “Independence Day” speech, President Olusegun Obasanjo spoke candidly:
“Far too many of our citizens still remain poor. Industry remains weak and inflation is a problem. After years of bad government under military regimes, everything, it seemed, had nearly collapsed: the economy, our physical infrastructure, the system of our social organization together with our values and morals” (The Washington Times, October 4, 2001; p.A17).
But earlier in March 2001, the same government had taken delivery of 9 Russian-made attack helicopters at a reported cost of $100 million – without approval of the National Assembly, which was clearly in violation of the Constitution. The 6 Mi-35 and 3 Mi-34 helicopters were expected to consolidate Nigeria’s position as West Africa’s unrivaled military leader (The New York Times, April 5, 2001; p.A6).
Upon assuming power on May 29, 1999, President Obasanjo vowed to recover the loot of former head of state, General Abacha. He established the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, ICPC. Never mind that his own Senate was riddled with graft and corruption. Much public fanfare was made of the sum of about $709 million and another 144 million pounds sterling recovered from the Abachas and his henchmen. But, as noted earlier in the series, this recovered loot itself was quickly re-looted. The Senate Public Accounts Committee found only $6.8 million and 2.8 million pounds sterling of the recovered booty in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (The Post Express (July 10, 2000).
For all that talk about corruption, only one senior official was sacked for corruption and none jailed for the two years since the democratically elected Olusegun Obasanjo took office. On October 15, 2001, Transparency International, the Geneva-based business organization that tracks global corruption, ranked Nigeria as the second most corrupt country in the world after Bangladesh. “Government officials still demand gratification for performing their official duties, and cases of inflated contracts still continue” (New African, Dec 2001; p.22). All these criminal acts were in violation of the Constitution.
Part 5
Summary So Far
“He who does not understand the cause of a problem cannot solve it” says an African proverb. The purpose of these series is to try and explain the source and causes of Nigeria’s problems, which are very similar to those plaguing other African countries.
Nigeria never really had much of a chance to fledge into a new fully-functioning nation after it gained its independence from Britain in 1960. Barely six years later, the first military coup came in 1966 – exactly the same year Ghana experienced its first coup. But since Nigeria suffered much longer under military regimes (29 years) than Ghana (21 years), the devastation wrought by military rule was far more catastrophic and extensive in Nigeria.
The destruction of Nigeria began during this period under military rule: 1966 to 1999 – a period where there were no Constitutions. Military rulers simply suspended them and ruled by decree. As such, there was no rule of law. The importance of a Constitution was explained in Part I of these series. A Constitution is like a yarn that weaves the fabric of a society or nation together. It comes before tribe or religion and it is that which stands between law, order and progress on one hand and chaos, carnage and destruction on the other. The Constitution is like traffic law, which ALL – regardless of tribe, religion, gender, or creed — must follow and obey; otherwise, there will be carnage, deaths and destruction on the roads.
During this period under military rule, there was no “traffic law” in Nigeria. Military governments spent recklessly as oil revenues flowed into their coffers. Their priorities were grotesquely misaligned, borrowing heavily and resorting to money creation to finance their profligacy. Nobody could hold them accountable. When inflation reared its ugly head, they changed the currency, the naira, in 1984 shattering confidence in the currency. Its value plummeted from one Naira to one Dollar in the early 1980s to one Naira to 100 Dollars in 1990. This triggered a banking crisis that pushed the banking system to the verge of collapse – Part II of the series.
It was also during this period that state organs and institutions – the judiciary, law enforcement, ministries, NEPA, NNPC — began to decay and crumble (Part III of series). Corruption spiraled out of control, as kamikaze military bandits plundered Nigeria’s wealth with impunity. In pre-dawn raids, Abacha for example sent trucks to cart away millions of dollars from the vaults of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Infrastructure – schools, roads, telecommunications, ports, harbors, airports, water supply, etc. – also began to deteriorate and fracture during this period – Part IV.
Intellectual Leadership Failure
Since there was no Constitution and rule of law, no one could be held accountable for anything. There was no value system; it was a dog-eat-dog world. “Government,” as generally known, ceased to exist. Stratocracy (rule by military men) transformed government into a predatory vampire state – a government hijacked by a phalanx of uniformed bandits, who used the machinery of the state to enrich themselves, their cronies and tribesmen. The vampire state recognized no obligations toward the people and did little for them — no health care for the people, no clean water nor electricity. Military rulers rather regarded the people as lambs to be fleeced.
Total government dysfunction, coupled with catastrophic failure of leadership, alienated the people from the state. People no longer trusted the government, regarding it not as a partner in development but as an “enemy” to be defeated. Pious statements by the government were greeted with derision and cynicism. Nigerians dismissed Abacha’s war on corruption as a crude oil joke.
The moral and social fabric of Nigeria became thoroughly shredded during this era. There were no laws to follow; even the military governments followed no laws. When people could no longer look up to the government for guidance on what is right and wrong, they retreated into their tribal and religious cocoons for safety by following tribal (customary) and religious laws.
However, the sad part about the ruination of Nigeria by its military rulers was the active support and collaboration they received from the most unlikely source: Nigeria’s intellectuals – the professors, scholars, teachers, etc. There was no concerted intellectual effort to challenge the military brutes and provide better leadership. Rather, so many of the intellectuals — some with Ph.D.s and who ought to have known better — sold out their conscience, integrity and principles to serve as errand-boys of military despots with half their intelligence. The allure of a Mercedes Benz, a diplomatic posting, and ministerial post often proved too irresistible. Hordes of highly “educated” Nigerian intellectuals hopped into bed with barbarous military regimes and accorded them the legitimacy and respectability they craved. Even Sani Abacha could always find intellectual prostitutes to abuse. Then, after being raped and defiled, they were discarded.
Intellectual Collaboration and Prostitution
This kind of intellectual prostitution made no sense whatsoever because in country after country in Africa, where military rule was entrenched, the educational institutions (especially of the tertiary level – universities, and colleges) all decayed — starved of funds by the military. Although the official excuse is always lack of funds, the military predators always found the money to purchase shiny new pieces of bazookas for their thugs. But the real reason? “It was not in the best interest of these military governments to educate their people,” said Wale Deyemi, then a doctoral student at the University of Lagos. “They do not want people to be able to challenge them” (The Washington Post, 6 October 1995, A30).
In Nigeria, the sciences were hardest hit. Science teachers were vanishing with such alarming frequency that Professor Peter Okebukola, the president of the National Science Teachers Association of Nigeria, lamented at the association’s thirty-sixth annual conference at Maiduguri that “good science teachers were increasingly becoming an endangered species” (African News Weekly, 13 October 1995, 17). But despite all this evidence, some Nigerian intellectuals still vociferously defended military regimes while their own institutions — the very places where they taught or obtained their education — deteriorated right under their very noses. One would have thought that these professors and intellectuals would have protected their own institutions, just as the soldiers jealously protected their barracks and kept them in top shape. But no! For a pittance, the intellectuals were willing to help supervise the destruction of their very own university system.
One such intellectual was Baba Gana Kingibe, a career diplomat, was the vice-presidential candidate of Moshood K. O. Abiola in the 12 June 1993 presidential elections. Abiola won the election fair and square, but the result was annulled by the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida. Baba Kingibe then accepted the post of foreign minister from that same military regime. Nor did he raise a whiff of protest or resign when his running mate, Abiola, was thrown into jail. Neither did Chief Tony Anenih, the chairman of the defunct Social Democratic Party, on whose ticket Abiola contested the 12 June election. In fact, Chief Anenih was part of a five-man delegation, sent by General Abacha to the United States in October 1995 to “educate and seek the support of Nigerians about the transition program.” At an October 22, 1995 forum organized by the Schiller Institute in Washington, “Chief Anenih and Colonel (rtd) Emeka O. Ojukwu took turns ripping apart the reputation of Abiola. Anenih took pains to discredit Chief Abiola, whom he said was being presented by the Western media as the victimized President-elect. Some of the Nigerians in the audience denounced the delegation as `paid stooges’ of Abacha” (African News Weekly, 3 November 1995, 3).
More pathetic was the case of Alex Ibru, the publisher of The Guardian Group of newspapers in Lagos who became the internal affairs minister. On 14 August 1994, his own newspaper was raided and shut down by the same military government under which he was serving. He did not protest or resign. After six months as interior minister, he too was tossed aside. In October 1995, his two newspapers, shut down by the military government for more than a year, were allowed to reopen after Ibru apologized to the authorities for any offensive reports they may have carried.
After the annulment of Nigeria’s 12 June elections, General Babangida was eased aside by the military top brass and Ernest Shonekan became the 89-day interim civilian president until he too was removed by the military despot, General Sani Abacha. On 19 September, Shonekan accompanied Nigeria’s foreign minister, Tom Ikimi, to London to deliver a “confidential message” to British Prime Minister John Major. Nigeria’s military junta told Westminster that it would pardon the 40 convicted coup plotters if British would help with the rescheduling Nigeria’s $35 billion debt, and support its transition program to democratic rule, its bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, and its attempt to gain U.S. recognition of its effort to fight drug trafficking.
First of all, how could Ernest Shonekan act as an emissary for the same barbarous military regime that overthrew him? Not only that, he accepted an appointment from Abacha to a committee of experts to plan for “Vision 2010.” Second, who thought that 35 years after “independence” from British colonial rule, Nigeria’s government would be holding its own citizens as hostages, demanding ransom from the former colonial power? It did not occur to any of the “educated” emissaries that their mission sank the concept of “independence from colonial rule” to new depths of depravity.
Dr. Tom Ikimi was the activist, who, in 1989, formed the Liberal Convention party to campaign for democracy in Nigeria. In June 1989 he launched a branch in the United Kingdom, where he made glorious speeches about participatory democracy and denouncing military regimes. Suddenly in 1994 he became Nigeria’s Foreign minister under the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha and joined Shonekan as emissary on the mission to UK. He even appeared on The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, on 3 August 1995, and strenuously defended Nigerian military government’s record on democratization, calling General Abacha “humane.”
Mercifully, the British refused to capitulate to the terroristic demands. Humiliated, Nigeria’s military government began snatching more hostages. Prominent human-rights lawyer, Gani Fawehinmi and his wife were arrested on Sept 22, 1993. He had repeatedly been arrested and detained so often that he kept a bag packed on hand, just in case. Earlier in March, supporters of his “illegal” National Conscience Party were arrested for distributing leaflets in Lagos, denouncing the lack of food, electricity, transportation and the general state of the nation. To convey the accused to court, police had to borrow his vehicles. And during the proceeding, Fawehinmi drew the magistrate’s attention to the fact that there was no electricity in the court room!
Among the 40 “convicted” coup plotters Shonekan and Ikimi tried to trade for British concessions was General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former head of state of Nigeria and the first military ruler to hand over power to a democratically-elected government in 1979. He was found “guilty” at the secret military trial. When his lawyer called a press conference to deny that his client was guilty, he was promptly arrested himself! Even more bizarre, Nigeria’s own military intelligence had no fore knowledge of any impending coup. It was rather reported by the private press — the same medium that the military had brutally attacked and closed. Acting upon this published information, military police sprang into action, indiscriminately arresting people, including Gen. Obasanjo.
I met General Obasanjo in Sept 1994 at a small private gathering in Montana-Crans, a village town nestled in the Swiss Alps. The gathering was sponsored by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Center For Applied Studies in International Negotiations (based in Geneva) and the Sasakawa Foundation of Tokyo. The object was to bring together a group of “African experts and specialists” to deliberate on African agriculture. The end product was the document, Forging The Road Ahead For African Agriculture.
Among the 14 of us were Gen. Obasanjo and Gen. Amadou Toumani Toure, who overthrew Mali’s long-standing tyrant, Gen. Moussa Traore, and stepped down within a year to usher in Mali’s first democratically-elected government in 1993. I must confess that I have never had any affection — zero — for military regimes or dictators in Africa. So at that gathering, I made a conscious, though futile, effort to avoid the company of the former military rulers.
One evening, however, Gen. Obasanjo invited me to join his dinner table. I indicated that there was no room at his table. “I will make one for you,” came the quick reply. To my utter astonishment, the general rose, moved his chair aside, grabbed a plate, silverware and a chair from the adjoining table, and made a place for me. I was stunned. I never thought I would meet a former African head of state who was so affable, down-to-earth, and jovial.
Gen. Obasanjo was quite loquacious, gushing profusely about his mediating role in African political feuds. He related to me his successful mediation of the quarrel between President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Joshua Nkomo, the Ndebele rebel leader. He agreed that the military had become “Africa’s headache.” On Nigeria’s political crisis, he told me he was working to get traditional rulers of Nigeria to persuade Gen. Abacha to release Chief Moshood Abiola. On African governance, he affirmed his beliefs in institutions, rather than leaders or personalities.
He impressed me a lot – back then. He was a true African nationalist, proud of his heritage. He deplored the large-scale importation of unworkable foreign models into Africa. He believed in building upon Africa’s traditional institutions and in development at the grass-roots level. More importantly, he practiced what he preached and bought a farm in Abeokuta when he handed over power in 1979.
I am relating this encounter with Gen (rtd) Obasanjo because he was harshly critical of Africa’s intellectuals. That won my heart. He claimed the intellectuals let Mathieu Kerekou of Benin down. “Sycophancy,” Gen Obasanjo bellowed with eyes ablaze, “is Africa’s greatest problem.” The intellectuals, he complained with palpable contempt, would sell their body and soul to win jobs and favors from corrupt African governments. He distrusted his own sycophantic ministers and relied more on his unofficial sources for information to keep in better touch with the people.
After we left Switzerland, I paid little attention to Gen. Obasanjo’s ruminations until he was arrested in March 1994 and charged with plotting, with others, to overthrow the Abacha regime in Nigeria. A false charge by an increasingly desperate and paranoid regime, I concluded. But his railings against “sycophancy” hit me hard in August when Tom Ikimi appeared on the MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour to defend the Abacha regime. He even called Abacha a “humane” person.
Sycophancy, lack of integrity, and susceptibility to graft had so infected the Nigerian intellectual community that few could be trusted, as Obasanjo said. Even Wole Soyinka, the Nobel laureate, knew that “several of his officers would desert [the pro-democracy crusade] tomorrow for a lucrative government post,” said The Economist (Sept 30, 1995; p.47).
At that time in the U.S., there were least 35 pro-democracy Nigerian organizations but many were “419″ (fake) organizations, sponsored and funded by Nigeria’s military junta to counter-act the “negative publicity” engendered by the activities of Trans-Africa. According to Randall Echols, Chief Abiola’s spokesman in the U.S., Nigeria’s military government spent $10 million in 1995 in a desperate public-relations effort to spruce up its battered international image. Paid ads were place in major U.S. newspapers, denouncing the call for sanctions and various Nigerian organizations staged pro-government demonstrations in the U.S.
One such organization, the Coalition for Peaceful Democracy led by Ben Igwe, marched on Sept 22 1995 in front of the White House. Another organization, the Nigerian National Leadership Forum, held a conference on Aug 12, 1995 in Nashville with the lofty aim of tackling “Nigeria’s problem.” The coordinator of the conference was Prof. David Muruako, president of the Organization of Nigerian Professionals (ONP). Now, there were two such organizations with exactly the same name (ONP) in exactly the same city (New Orleans). The other was headed by Prof. Gibson Chigbu. The two were embroiled in an 8-year legal battle to determine which should keep the name, ONP. But Muruako’s ONP was among the names of Nigerian organizations that condemned TransAfrica’s crusade in a paid advertisement in The Washington Times (May 25, 1995).
In attendance were Nigeria’s Ambassador, Alhaji Zubair Kazaure and other officials from the Nigerian Embassy. Opening the conference, Prof. Muruako insisted that Nigeria’s greatest problem was tribalism. Naturally. Participants, one after another identified corruption, poverty, lack of rule of law and foreign meddling. None pointed at the depredations of the military regime itself. In his keynote address, Ambassador Kazaure asked the audience not to blame the problem of ethnicity on the military government but to blame the British colonialists. Naturally. “It is not fair to blame this present (Abacha) government or any Nigerian government for the problems of ethnicity in Nigeria, he added. In a sense, the Ambassador was right that Nigeria’s military rulers were not to blame for the ruination of the country. His blame however was misplaced. He should have looked at himself and the class of Nigeria’s intellectuals, professionals or elites — both at home and abroad.
Vile opportunism, unflappable sycophancy, and trenchant collaboration on the part of Nigeria’s intellectuals allowed tyranny to become entrenched. Babangida, Abacha and other military dictators legitimized and perpetuated their rule by buying off and co-opting Nigeria’s academics for a pittance. And when they fall out of favor, they are beaten up, tossed aside or worse. In Nov 1994, Gen. Abacha tossed all of them out of his cabinet. Remember Alex Ibru? On Feb 2, 1996, unidentified gunmen in a deep-blue Peugeot 504 trailed him and sprayed his car with machine-gun fire. The editor-in-chief, Femi Kusa, said that the car was bullet-ridden and Ibru was injured. He was flown to Britain for treatment.
The Lost Generation
The saddest and greatest casualty of decades military misrule, mismanagement and the corruption frenzy was the generation of Nigerians born in the 1980s. Nigeria’s military governments could not provide them with basic social services such as education, health care, sanitation, etc. Governments were towering edifices of ineptitude, corruption, and waste. The educational system has been a shambles. University degrees were openly bought. The electricity supply was intermittent; only 30 percent of Nigerians – even today — have access to a reliable supply of electricity. The clean water supply has been spasmodic. Nigeria is an oil-producing country but must import refined petroleum products from abroad.
In the absence of a constitution, law and order, the youth grew up without knowing the principles and values that serve as a glue holding the nation together. They had no role models with moral stature; the military rulers were autocratic bandits and the intellectuals were servicing their needs. In that “dog-eat-dog” environment, the youth didn’t know what was right or wrong; the value system had collapsed. Hard work and entrepreneurship no longer assured success and wealth because there was no rule of law; political connections mattered more. The youth became increasingly confused, disenchanted, lost, and restless. They were poorly educated and faced a dire job market.
Abandoned by their own governments, the youth began to drift, becoming susceptible to radical ideas and religious extremism. Some sought escape in rickety boats to Europe. Others turn to crime (drug trafficking, Internet scams) and prostitution. Still others joined extremist groups that sought violent change. One of them is Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 25-year old Nigerian serving a prison term in the U.S.
His foiled attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day in 2009 baffled many Africans and sent them scrambling for an explanation. This was not the stereotypical poor and desperate young man usually associated with violence on the continent. For one, Abdulmutallab was the son of a wealthy Nigerian banker and former government minister. His father even tipped off the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria to his son’s growing radicalism. Second, neither Islam nor Christianity is indigenous to Africa, and the idea of dying on behalf of a foreign religion is absurd to most Africans. Third, the United States was never a colonial power in Africa and, therefore, it seemed an odd target. In fact, it has always been a popular destination for many young Nigerians looking to emigrate. He was raised in the rip-roaring 1980s during military rule in free-wheeling corruption ridden environment with no constitutional rule of law.
To be fair, the Buhari regime (1984 – 1985) attempted to clean up the political culture with a focus on discipline and accountability. The regime set out to recover stolen state assets and ill-gotten wealth from politicians and other public officers through special military tribunals that were set up. It also launched “War Against lndiscipline”(WAI) campaign to fight laziness, lateness, disorderliness, hoarding and examination malpractices and to inculcate habits of cleanliness, order, patriotism and nationalism in the citizenry. In a large measure, these efforts won the hearts of many Nigerians and “WAI” became an important legacy of the Buhari Administration. However, an assortment of new decrees imposing long prison terms and the death penalty for “miscellaneous offenses” or “economic sabotage,” as well as examination malpractice, counterfeiting, drug and currency trafficking, drew much flak from some quarters as being too draconian.
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Footnote: Obasanjo impressed me in Geneva in 1994 but his administration from 1999 to 2007 was scandalously ineffective. Never mind that he sought to change the Constitution to run for a third term.
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Editor’s Note: Professor George Ayittey is a U.S based, top Ghanaian economist. He’s an author and president of the Free Africa Foundation in Washington DC. He is a professor at American University, and an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has consistently championed the argument that "Africa is poor because she is not free".
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Vol 5, No 22, May 28, 2001, available at: http://www.afrifund.com/wiki/index.pcgi?page=CtrySomaliland
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Van Notten, Michael (2006). The Law of the Somalis. Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc.
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